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It's Just Business, Or Is It?: How
Business and Politics Collide With
Sovereign Wealth Funds
By MATTHEW SAXON*
I. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Suspicions and Reactions
A.

What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?

The U.S. Treasury Department defines Sovereign Wealth Funds
("SWFs") as government investment vehicles funded by foreign
exchange assets, which manage those assets separately from official
reserves.1 Basically, any time a government aggressively invests a
large amount of its official reserves abroad it could be classified as a
SWF. These pools of government money are invested more
aggressively than traditional government reserves because they are
2
intended to generate large returns.
B. Why have lawmakers suddenly become concerned with
sovereign wealth funds?
There are several reasons why these vast pools of government
money have stirred suspicion. First, most SWFs are controlled by
countries with a low degree of government accountability compared
to a Western-style democracy. 3 Some of the largest funds reside in
the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China,
* Bachelor of Arts, Colgate University, J.D. Candidate, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, May 2009.
1. Clay Lowery, Under Secretary for International Affairs, Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's Conference on the Asian Financial Crisis
(June 21, 2007).
2. David McCormick, Under Secretary for International Affairs, Testimony
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 14,
2007).
3. Tom Holland, A Passive Solution for Sovereign Wealth Funds, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 3, 2008, at 12.
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and Kuwait. 4 A low degree of government accountability makes it
5
is easier for these governments to take huge risks with state money.
Consequently, of the ten biggest SWFs, only one is a Western-style
democracy: Norway. However, Norwegian law prohibits the funds'
investment from becoming too risky by requiring 60 percent of the
fund to be in fixed income, a constraint not felt by other less
accountable regimes. 6 Overall there are about forty SWFs in the
world today 7.
The second cause for the increased suspicion surrounding
SWFs is their value. By 2015, SWFs collectively could be worth $12
trillion, up from $2.5 trillion today. 8 To put that number in
perspective, the total amount of money under management in the
world's hedge funds is around $1.4 trillion. 9 This fact becomes even
more remarkable when one considers that the $1.4 trillion dollars in
hedge funds is spread out among thousands of independent firms,
while the $2.5 trillion to $3 trillion of sovereign wealth fund money
is essentially controlled by a few heads of state. Although there
currently are about forty SWFs, the top seven funds control $2.27
trillion, which further exaggerates the concentration of wealth. 10
The third reason for the recent interest in SWFs is their sudden
increased activity. Middle Eastern funds spent around $82.4 billion
this year, compared to just $4.5 billion in 2004.11 The principal
reason for the recent increase in activity is the credit crisis that has

4. Editorial, Sovereign-wealth Funds: The World's Most Expensive Club,
May 26, 2007, at 79 [hereinafter, World's Most Expensive Club].
5. Anders Aslund, The Truth About Sovereign Wealth Funds, FOREIGN POLICY,
Dec. 2007.
6. Rachel Ziemba, Responses to Sovereign Wealth Funds:Are 'Draconian' Measures
on the Way?, ROuBINI GLOBAL ECONOMICS SERVICE, Nov. 2007, at 6, available at
http://www.rgemonitor.com/economonitor-monitor/220669/responses to_
sovereign wealthfundsaredraconianmeasuresontheway.
7. David McCormick, Under Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Testimony before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 14, 2007).
8. Robert Schroeder, SEC Looking at Sovereign Wealth Funds, MARKET WATCH,
July 31, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/secgrappling-sovereign-wealth-funds/story.aspx?guid={9BBBCE9F-EF92-4D48-A6BFC14F2E334E8A}.
9. Editorial, Sovereign Impunity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2007, at A12.
10. The World's Most Expensive Club, supra note 4, at 79.
11. Nick Timiraos, Will Overseas Funds Be a Juggernaut?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
2007, at All.
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been reaping havoc on U.S. financial institutions. 12 Financial
institutions have been making massive write-downs and
desperately need cash on their balance sheets. SWFs have cash and
are willing to invest it.13 Congress, which desperately wants to
alleviate the pain of the current crisis, has thus far approved these
investments. As Senator Charles Schumer noted, "[w]hat would the
average American say if Citigroup is faced with the choice of 10,000
layoffs or more foreign investments?" 14 The fact that SWFs have
come to the rescue of many U.S. companies proves that they can
offer great benefits to the global financial system.
The fourth reason for the increase in attention around SWFs is
the mystery that surrounds these funds. SWFs have proven adept at
avoiding

U.S.

and

European

in general, 16
17

regulatory

law, 15

they

lack

transparency
and they could have undesirable effects
on shareholders.
It is not coincidental that when SWFs buy shares in a U.S.
company, the deal is usually for 4.9 percent or 9.9 percent. 18 Edwin
Truman, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, points out, "[tihey negotiate contracts in light of the
regulatory regime in the United States."19 U.S. securities and
banking laws increase the amount of scrutiny and oversight when
investors reach a 5 percent or 10 percent threshold. 20 Abu Dhabi's
recent investment in Citigroup brought its total stake in that
company up to 4.9 percent. 2' A Chinese investment fund executive
admitted that the 9.9 percent stake that China bought in Blackstone

12. This note was written at the outset of the financial crisis (when it was
merely known as the "credit crisis") and does not incorporate information after
March of 2008.
13. Editorial, The invasion of the sovereign-wealth fund, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008,
at 11 [hereinafter, Invasion].
14. Dennis K. Berman & Bob Davis, Lobbyists Smoothed the Way For a Spate of
Foreign Deals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2008, at Al.
15. David Enrich, Damian Paletta & Randall Smith, Citigroup,Merrill Seek More
Foreign Capital,WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2008, at Al [hereinafter, Citigroup].
16. Timiraos, supra note 11, at All.
17. Katharina Bart, Rick Carew, Chip Cummins & Marcus Walker, Barriers to
Entry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at Cl [hereinafter, Barriers to Entry].
18. Citigroup, supra note 15, at Al.
19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id.
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was meant to avoid garnering attention from Congress. 22 The
Chinese also bought a 9.9 percent stake in Morgan Stanley in
December 2007.23 Other countries have caught on; Singapore's
investment in Merrill Lynch will keep its stake in Merrill just below
24
10 percent.
SWFs, for the most part, are not transparent since all disclosures
are made on a purely voluntary basis. 25 Many of the funds release
little information about their investment aims or holdings, which
further deepens the anxiety in Europe and the U.S.26 The lack of
available information can lead to an increase in volatility in markets,
since markets do not like uncertainty. 27
This lack of transparency has made lawmakers nervous. In a
recent Presidential debate, Hillary Clinton emphasized the need for
transparency in SWFs. She argued that, "[w]e've got to know more
about them (SWFs), they've got to be more transparent... I want
the United States Congress and the Federal Reserve Board to ask
these tough questions." 28 Senator Evan Bayh (D. Ind.) declared, "[a]
lack of transparency that characterizes many sovereign-wealth
funds undermines the theory of efficient markets at the heart of our
economic system." 29 In the long run greater transparency would be
a good thing for the SWFs themselves because lawmakers would
feel more comfortable with them, and would therefore be less likely
to interfere or over-regulate.
The lack of transparency may also make shareholders nervous.
SWFs may have both positive and negative effects on shareholders.
They can be good because the share price may go up, as was the
case when China infused Morgan Stanley with $5 billion, jolting
shares up 4 percent. 30 Further, SWFs may benefit investors in
22. Berman & Davis, supra note 14, at Al.
23. What's News, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 20, 2007, at Al.
24. Citigroup, supra note 15, at Al.
25. Bob Davis, Wanted: SWFs' Money Sans Politics, WALL ST. J.,Dec. 20, 2007, at
C1 [hereinafter, Money Sans Politics].
26. Id.
27. Timiraos, supra note 11, at All.
28. Susanne Craig, David Enrich & Robin Sidel, World Rides to Wall Street's
Rescue, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2008, at Al [hereinafter, Wall Street's Rescue].
29. Press Release from Senator Bayh, Senator Bayh Raises Concerns with
Sovereign Wealth Funds (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.senate.gov
/-bayh/record.cfm?id=287530 (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
30. What's News, supra note 23, at Al.
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another less obvious way.
Since SWFs have become large,
influential shareholders in many financial institutions, these funds
have the ability to hold the management accountable for mistakes
and lackluster performance. 31
However, the problem is that SWFs may not feel comfortable
demanding such accountability if they think it will lead to political
backlash and increased regulation. SWFs are reluctant to be too
vocal, which effectively gives management a free pass, and hurts
average shareholders who rely on a major shareholder to hold
management accountable.
As the Wall Street Journal reports,
"Worse, every incendiary article, news report and political speech
about the 'danger' posed by sovereign investment reinforces the
instinct of such funds to be headline-shy, controversy-averse, and
unwilling to join other shareholders in pushing noisily for change,
32
even needed change."
SWF investments may also hurt shareholders.
Most
shareholders are not active, meaning that they do not vote, resulting
in the possibility that a SWF could have disproportionate control.33
If only 5 percent of a company's shareholders vote, then a SWF with
a 10 percent stake can control the company. The director of one
Swiss bank fears that poor turnout at shareholder meetings could
artificially inflate a SWF's influence and lead to an informal veto
right. 34 However, the fact that SWFs have a disproportionate stake
is negative only if it is used improperly and thus far there is scant
evidence of such impropriety. As long as SWFs have purely
financial motives, they should be encouraged to hold management
accountable when circumstances require.
The final and most important reason for the concern over SWFs
is their possible political motivations. Sovereign countries control
SWFs. Consequently, SWFs could be used to achieve political
instead of financial ends. The possibility for investing money with
dual motives has caused "widespread suspicion in Washington and
European capitals, especially in regards to funds run by Russia,
China, and the oil states of the Middle East." 35 Adrian BlundellWignall, the deputy director of the Organization for Economic
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Sovereign Wimp Funds,WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,2008, at A24.
Id.
Barriers to Entry, supra note 17, at C1.
Id.
Money Sans Politics, supranote 25, at C1.
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Cooperation and Development, points out that national pension
funds do not face political backlash because their motivations are
seen as purely commercial. 36 He goes on to suggest that SWFs
should adopt a similar structure, in which SWF managers would
have a fiduciary duty to the citizens of the country to produce the
37
highest return possible.
Such an obligation may assuage some of the fears in the West,
however, it is not clear how such a fiduciary duty would be
enforced. Any politically motivated investment would probably be
made at the behest of the head of state. It would be unlikely for the
head of state to punish a fund manager who violated his fiduciary
duty by making a politically motivated investment that the head of
state endorsed.
Under the current structure of most SWFs, political leaders
have no fiduciary duty and can actively engage in investment
strategies for any reason. 38 The Economist acknowledged this reality,
"[t]he motives of the sovereign moneymen could be sinister: stifling
competition, protecting national champions, engaging in
geopolitical troublemaking." 39 The U.S. Treasury Deputy Secretary
Robert Kimmett asserts, "[t]he benefits of SWF investments to the
recipient countries depend on the extent to which the behavior of
SWFs is economically driven.., rather than politically driven." 40 In
the short life span of the SWF almost all evidence points to a purely
financial motivation.
Russia is the only SWF country that has indicated that it may be
willing to use its wealth as a political weapon. Russia cut off a gas
pipeline to Ukraine after that country elected a pro-Western
41
government; Russia claimed it was accidental.
Even SWFs run by fully democratic U.S. allies have motivations
that sometimes go beyond the financial bottom line. Last year,
Norway divested itself of its shares in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., valued
at $416 million, citing serious and systemic human and labor rights

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Invasion, supra note 13, at 11.
39. Id.
40. Robert Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets, FOREIGN AFF. MAG.,
January/February, 2008.
41. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, EC to Rule on Sovereign Wealth Funds, THE
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 29, 2007.
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abuses as its reason.
There are obviously potential situations that would be far more
troubling than Norway's divestment based on an aversion to WallMart's labor abuses. For instance, there is the possibility that oilproducing governments may try to use their clout in financial
institutions to prevent the institution from investing in alternative
energy. 43 Another possibility was recently pointed out by formerTreasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who asked, "[w]hat about
the day when a country joins some 'coalition of the willing' and asks
the U.S. president to support a tax break for a company in which it
has invested?" 44 These are hypothetical situations, but Western
countries should be aware of them. Fortunately, it will not take a set
of protectionist regulations to prevent these hypotheticals from
becoming reality.
As discussed in section III, a country can
sufficiently protect its interests, and simultaneously welcome SWF
investments.
C.

Sovereign Wealth Funds' Reactions to Western Fears

SWFs recognize that regulators in the U.S. and Europe are
worried about their emergence. They have taken an interesting and
clever approach to stay below the radar. First, SWFs have made
every effort to relieve the fears of regulators by promising to be
passive participants 45 and by buying non-voting stock. 46
Despite efforts to keep a low profile, SWFs have sent a clear
message that they are willing to take their money elsewhere if
Western countries over-regulate. This is a reality that the U.S. and
Europe must face as emerging economies continue to present
attractive alternative investment opportunities.
The U.S. and
Europe should attempt to attract SWF investment and not scare it
away, especially considering that American and European financial
institutions and corporations are desperate for cash. Kuwait's
investment fund is cutting its U.S. and European investments from
90 percent to 70 percent of its portfolio. 4 7 The fund's manager is
42. Timiraos, supra note 11, at All.
43. David Wessel, The Risks of Sovereign Funding,WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2007, at A2.
44. Id.
45. Andrew Batson and Jason Dean, China Investment Fund May Tread Softly,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2007, at A2.
46. Ziemba, supra note 6, at 5.
47. Henny Sender, Deep Well: How a Gulf Petro-StateInvests Its Oil Riches, WALL
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moving the money to China and India, due to the rapid economic
The chief executive of Dubai
growth in those countries. 48
International Capital, a government-owned investment fund, has
made clear that he is looking to invest more in Asia than Europe and
the U.S. He asserted that this was partly due to geography, but also
reflected worry about the U.S. economic and regulatory
conditions. 49 The head of China's SWF has stated that if any country
has misgivings about China's SWF being there, the fund may just
leave and look to invest elsewhere. 50 Unfortunately, unfounded
xenophobic fears have already blocked foreign investment from
entering the U.S.
Perhaps the most famous example of political backlash against
a state-controlled foreign investment in the U.S. is the Dubai Ports
deal, which collapsed under grassroots political opposition. Dubai
Ports World, which is controlled by Dubai's government, attempted
to acquire a British company that controlled U.S. ports.51 The deal
fell through due to the strong political backlash.5 2 Turned away by
U.S. lawmakers, Dubai Ports World is now expanding around the
world in places like China, Peru, and Vietnam.53 Of course, the U.S.
Coast Guard controls security at all U.S. ports, so regardless of
which country owns the port, the security is unaffected.
The U.S. government should not be so quick to react to the fears
of the electorate because there are sufficient procedures in place that
scrutinize all foreign investment deals. In fact the U.S. system is so
effective that the Europeans should consider using it as a model for
their own investment laws.
II. U.S. and European Approaches
A.

U.S. Foreign Investment Law

The U.S. has laws in place that regulate and investigate foreign
investment deals, however some lawmakers are now questioning
ST. J., Aug. 24, 2007, at Al.
48. Id.
49. Barriers to Entry, supra note 17, at C1.
50. Steven R. Weisman, China Tries to Reassure U.S. About Its Investing Plans,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2008, at C2.
51. Timiraos, supra note 11, at All.
52. Id.
53. Wessel, supra note 43, at A2.
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whether those regulations are sufficient to deal with the rapid
expansion and aggressive tactics of SWFs.5 4 This section will
analyze both current U.S. procedures and proposals lawmakers
have set forth to amend those procedures.
Officially, the U.S. welcomes all investments except those that
could compromise national security. 55 Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson maintained, "[w]e welcome foreign investment in the
United States from sovereign wealth funds or any direct
investment." 56 He has also stated, "I'd like nothing more than to get
more of that money. But I understand that there's a natural fear that
57
they're going to buy up America."
All foreign investment in the United States is subject to the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act ("FINSA").58 FINSA
created the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
("CFIUS"), which implements the Act. 59 The committee reviews
foreign investments in the United States, looking for possible
national security issues. 60 The Act requires heightened scrutiny
when a foreign state controls an investment, as is the case with
SWFs.61 However, if a government buys a small voting stake or a
passive stake in a company, where it does not seek to influence the
company's behavior, it is presumed not to pose a national security
62
threat.
Some government officials would like to expand the foreign
investment review process. The Treasury Department recently
stated that it is considering reviewing non-national security
concerns when it comes to SWFs.63 David McCormick, the Under

54. Wall Street's Rescue, supra note 28, at Al.
55. Steven R. Weisman, Sovereign Funds Stir Growing Unease, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 21, 2007, at 1 [hereinafter, Sovereign Funds].
56. Henry Paulson, Sec'y of Treasury, Address at Beijing, China (Aug. 1, 2007),
availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp525.htm.
57. Sovereign Funds, supra, note 55.
58. David McCormick, Under Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Testimony before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 14,2007).
59. Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) of 2007, 50 U.S.C. § 3
(West 2007).
60. David McCormick, Under Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Testimony before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 14, 2007).
61. Id.
62. Berman & Davis, supra note 14, at Al.
63. David McCormick, Under Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Testimony before the
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Secretary for International Affairs, highlighted the concerns that
SWFs generate, which include, "inefficient allocation of capital,
perceived unfair competition with private firms, or the pursuit of
broader strategic rather than strictly economic return-oriented
investments." 64 McCormick also stressed that a shift in SWFs' assets
could cause financial instability and volatility since they are large,
concentrated, and often non-transparent. 65 Despite these concerns,
most Treasury officials have maintained that FINSA is enough to
66
protect national security.
Alan Larson, the Senior International Policy Advisor at
Covington & Burling LLP, detailed how FINSA should be
implemented during his testimony in front of a Senate Panel on
foreign investment in the United States. 67 Larson set forth four
policies for effective implementation of FINSA.68
First he asserted FINSA should focus on the narrow class of
investments that raise threats to national security. 69
Some
lawmakers have argued that they should expand the class of
investments subject to review. 70
Such a proposal would be
misguided. Once the review process is broadened beyond national
security there is no clear line on where to stop it. This will
exacerbate the fear and uncertainly among foreign investors and
stifle investment in the U.S. FINSA should continue to focus only on
deals that have clear national security implications.
Second, he recommended investigators focus on acquisitions
that establish control, defined as the ability to direct, determine, and
decide major business issues, as opposed to acquisitions that result
in a minority interest. 71 Again this is a prudent strategy. Focusing
on every deal would dilute CFIUS' resources, and would delay
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 14, 2007).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Alan P. Larson, Senior Int'l Policy Advisor, Covington & Burling LLP,
Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
(Nov. 14, 2007).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Berman & Davis, supra note 14, at Al.
71. Alan P. Larson, Senior Int'l Policy Advisor, Covington & Burling LLP,
Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
(Nov. 14, 2007).
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almost all SWF investments in the U.S.
His third recommendation is for FINSA to focus on acquisitions
where a foreign government controls the investment entity.72
Obviously, this would directly implicate SWFs, which are by
definition controlled by the government.
Finally, Larson contends that "national security" should remain
undefined in order to retain flexibility when determining which
deals to scrutinize. 73 The disadvantage in not defining the term
"national security" is that it makes the U.S. review process
somewhat opaque. If the U.S. and Europe are going to demand
transparency from SWFs, the U.S. and Europe also have an
obligation to be as clear and transparent in their regulatory schemes.
SWFs will want consistency, and they will want to know what to
expect from the review process. By designating specific sectors of
the economy as sensitive to national security, the U.S. can forewarn
SWFs about a possible investigation. For the time being Congress
seems content with leaving the review process as it stands.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has been
somewhat more skeptical than the Treasury Department.
Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, questioned the motives of
the sovereign wealth funds. 74 Cox was concerned with the growing
governmental and potentially political influence over capital market
flows that the sovereign wealth funds portend, stating that SWFs
present "challenges to a regulatory system premised on free
markets, the free flow of information and investor incentives based
on profit and loss." 75 For the time being it seems unlikely that
Congress, the SEC, or the Treasury Department will enact
significant changes to CFIUS.
It would be a mistake to heighten our regulatory standards
without evidence that such a step is necessary. Thus far, there is no
evidence that SWFs are investing in the U.S. with ulterior political
motives. Until SWFs demonstrate that their goals are political or
non-commercial, the regulators should rely on the current system,
which has proven to be sufficient.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Schroeder, supra note 8.
Id.
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B. EuropeanApproaches
This section will discuss and contrast the approaches employed
by Europe's three largest economies, Germany, Great Britain, and
France, in dealing with SWF investment.
Great Britain
There has been little political backlash against SWFs in Britain.
In a speech last year, Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer,
opposed any new protectionist policies in Britain.76 He maintained
that an open economy has always been good to Britain, and it would
be good for the rest of the world as well.77 Gordon Brown, before
becoming Prime Minister, clearly set out his position on foreign
investment, stating, "[p]eople [are] saying, '[c]lose the borders,
shelter our industries, protect our jobs' - even the people that are
arguing that know that it's an illusion to think that you can stop
change." 78 Brown sees the influx of foreign money as inevitable;
Britain has a choice to either welcome the money or stand by and
watch as another country welcomes it. He has rejected the latter
approach.
Commenting on Britain's laissez-faire attitude, a recent The Wall
79
Street Journal article declared, "The United Kingdom is for sale."
The article went on to explain that as the rest of Europe puts up
barriers to block foreign investment, Britain has taken the opposite
approach.80 While the U.S. does not allow foreign companies to buy
airlines, shipping firms, television networks, and other security
81 It is
related industries, Britain embraces all foreign investment.
unlikely that Britain will impose any new regulations on SWFs.
Attitudes in Britain have certainly changed since 1987. In that
year Kuwait's SWF bought 20 percent of British Petroleum. The
British government responded by forcing the SWF to sell half of its
i.

76. Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the London
Business School (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
speechschex_250707.htm.
77. Id.
78. Alistair MacDonald and Jason Singer, Britainfor Sale: Foreign Owners May Be
Secret of U.K.'s Success, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007 at Al.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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stake.8 2 In contrast, the Qatar Investment Authority recently bought
a 20 percent stake in the London Stock Exchange, which comes on
the heels of a deal in which another group from Dubai bought a 28
percent stake.83 One major reason for the change in attitude, and the
sometimes vehement opposition to increases in oversight, is
Britain's current position as a leader in attracting foreign investment
flows.84 Britain does not want to jeopardize its status by making
investment more burdensome.
Britain, almost certainly, will be critical of any EU response that
would lead to stricter regulations and impede foreign investment.
Alistair Darling has already gone on the offensive, criticizing the
more protectionist minded European governments, stating, "I think
it is nonsense. Economic patriotism is protectionism, and there is no
other name for it."85 As long as Darling and Brown are in power,
Britain will retain its laissez-faire approach, despite grumblings
from Germany and France.
ii.

Germany

It has been a different story in Germany, where Chancellor
Angela Merkel stated that purchases by foreign governments pose a
risk.8 6
Merkel made clear that her central concern is the
commingling of business and politics, asserting, "State-owned funds
can also have politico-strategic aims in mind that could be
problematic in sensitive areas." 87 The German government has
labeled SWF activity as "mischievous behavior." 88 In a separate
statement Merkel confirmed her uneasiness, asserting, "One cannot
simply react as if these are completely normal funds of privately
pooled capital." 89 Much of the German anxiety over SWFs seems to
stem from concerns over Russia; Chancellor Merkel has twice
stepped in to defend German companies from Russia.90 In its efforts
82. Asset-backed insecurity, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 71.
83. MacDonald & Singer, supra note 78, at Al.
84. Evans-Pritchard, supra note 41, at 5.
85. EU to Consider Protectionfrom State-Funded Foreign Takeovers, EURACTIV.COM,
(July 24, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/eu-consider-protectionstate-funded-foreign-takeovers/article-165798 (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
86. Sovereign Funds, supra note 55.
87. Vidya Ram, Merkel Plays Protector,FORBES, July 20, 2007.
88. Invasion, supra note 13, at 11.
89. Ziemba, supra note 6, at 7.
90. Evans-Pritchard, supra note 41, at 5.
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to protect itself from Russia, Germany must be careful not to scare
away non-threatening foreign investment.
Merkel advocates a unified EU response that would resemble
the CFIUS in the United States. 91 However, more investment
friendly European countries such as Great Britain and Ireland are
not fully on board with such a "common response" since it would
force them to step up their foreign investment oversight laws. 92
Germany is in the process of drafting a law that would enable it
to block corporate takeovers by SWFs, however, the criteria for
blocking the takeover bids are still being debated. 93 The German
Finance Minister said that he wants sectors such as media,
telecommunications, and banking protected from foreign state
controlled funds. 94
One proposal would give the German
government the ability to block investments resulting in 25 percent
ownership in strategic sectors. 95
Some provisions of the bill are clear examples of the difficulties
of maintaining a protectionist stance in a globalized world. For
example, the bill would exempt bids from other European Union
countries from increased scrutiny. 96 After all, Germany could
hardly survive without investment from other European nations,
and strict regulatory laws against all foreign investment could have
the undesired effect of chilling even European allies from investing
in Germany.
Other provisions may have a similar undesired affect. For
instance, Chancellor Merkel would like Germany to be able to
invoke the law when Germany thinks foreigners are trying to buy
German companies for "mischievous reasons." 97 Figuring out what
qualifies as a "mischievous reason," and when a certain bid meets
the criteria would be an exercise in mind reading. The law currently
would not necessarily limit intervention to specific sectors like
defense.
This leaves many financiers fearful that all SWF
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investment could be eliminated. 98 If an investment in any sector
were open to a heightened review process, it would be a significant
deterrent to investing in Germany.
Despite the strong rhetoric, it seems likely that the proposed
German law will eventually mimic the U.S. CFIUS. Even if this
turns out to be the case, SWF investment in Germany still could be
hampered because SWFs may have doubts that the German process
will be as efficient, translucent, and unbiased as the U.S. process,
which SWFs have become accustomed to over the years.
The German's delay in legislative action may indicate that
German politicians are quick to satisfy German nationalists with big
rhetoric, but slow to take action that will hurt Germany's chances of
competing with other European countries. Regardless, Germany
must be wary of an overzealous law that would stifle foreign
investment.
iii. France
France has largely echoed the fears and concerns voiced in
Germany. Officially, France supports a coordinated EU response,
and like Germany, France seems to be wary of SWFs in general.99
France's tradition of protecting its "national champion" companies
will probably persist, at least under the leadership of President
Nicolas Sarkozy. 100 President Sarkozy has already promised to
protect "innocent French managers" from the "extremely aggressive
sovereign funds." 101 At a European Union summit President
Sarkozy warned, "We've decided not to let ourselves be sold down
the river by speculative funds, by unscrupulous attitudes that do
not meet the transparency criteria one is entitled to expect in a
civilized world. It's unacceptable and we have decided not to
accept it."102 Sarkozy objects to the current situation where SWFs
can buy any French company, while denying France the
103
opportunity to invest in their home countries.
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France and Germany do not see completely eye to eye on all
issues, which further confuses the European situation.
One
difference is that France would prefer a code of conduct instead of
stronger direct regulation. 104 It is not clear what a code of conduct
would entail, but presumably it would include recommendations
for increased transparency and disclosure.
Germany has also been critical of French law. Both France and
Germany seek to protect their most prized companies. France,
however, has a very broad definition of "strategic industries" which
receive heightened protection 0 5 Germany views this approach as
overly protectionist. 106 Such a broad definition could be used as a
pretext, allowing France to guard its companies against any foreign
threat.
The French and German protectionist attitudes have not gone
unnoticed by SWF managers. Lou Jiwei, head of China's investment
fund, recently said that his fund would not invest in some European
countries because he felt extremely unwelcome there. 107 Germany
and France should tone down their rhetoric because it seems that
they are losing investments based solely on their strong language.
Despite their strong rhetoric, Germany and France seem to
understand the need for SWF investment, so there is a possibility
they could strike a compromise with Britain and adopt a unified EU
system.
iv. European Union
The European Union as a whole is looking into the adoption of
an institution similar to the CFIUS in the United States. 08 The
European Commission is worried that different approaches by
different EU countries will eventually lead to a race to the bottom
where no regulation exists because each country is trying to attract
the most investment. 109 The problem is that there is not a unified
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front in Europe; British officials continue to maintain that it is not an
issue that requires regulation at the EU level." 0
Gordon Brown has been critical of the approaches offered by
his European colleagues, Brown believes that "national champion"
companies, which Spain, France, and Italy seek to protect from
takeover, will emerge through competition, not government
interference."' The U.S. tends to side with Britain. Alan Larson is
apprehensive about the protectionist approaches being taken by
some European countries, warning,
[Slome of these laws [in Europe] already tilt too far in the
direction of investment screening. They place limitations on
inward investment and acquisitions based not on national
security reasons, but rather on fuzzy rationales such as economic
security or maintaining the dominant position of national
champions. There is a real risk that new laws and regulations will
112
go too far in restricting investment.
Larson also highlights another major source of tension between
European countries: "economic security." 113 As Larson points out
the term "economic security" is not easily defined, and it seems to
be nothing more than a "fuzzy rationale" used to defend
protectionist laws.114
The "economic security" approach will only cause more
confusion and suspicion between SWFs and Europe. If Europe
wants SWFs to be more transparent, it is difficult to justify foreign
investment laws that are based on hollow rationales such as
"economic security." SWFs will feel insecure when making deals in
Europe, and rightfully so. The entire deal could be blown up if it is a
"threat to economic security." Precise, clear language should be
used whenever possible to ensure that foreign investment laws
result in predictable, consistent outcomes.
III. Conclusion and Recommendations
Transparency and clarity are the keys to a successful
relationship between SWFs and the West because these attributes
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will create trust between the two sides. SWFs from around the
world should collaborate and compose a set of standards and
disclosure requirements that apply to all SWFs. Information about
current investments, investment-goals, and investment strategies
need to be disclosed. Transparency will help SWFs in the long run
by assuaging Western fears and thereby creating more investment
opportunities and fewer regulations.
Regulations on SWFs need to be written with the utmost clarity,
so that SWFs are able to anticipate the regulatory and oversight
procedures to which their investments will be subject. Undefined
terms and provisions that allow a state to arbitrarily block an
investment will deter foreign investments. The West cannot
demand greater transparency from SWFs, while its own review
procedures remain arbitrary, subjective, and opaque.
Europe is more likely than the U.S. to react legislatively to
SWFs since the U.S. already has procedures in place. Europe needs
to unify its response. This will be a difficult task, but it is necessary
both to prevent European countries from unfairly protecting their
industries, and also to prevent a race to the bottom where every
country tries to attract investment by relaxing regulatory laws. The
common European response should closely mimic the CFIUS. SWFs
are already familiar and comfortable with this process, and CFIUS
has proven itself to be a sufficient form of regulation.
SWFs and the West are not familiar business partners, but that
is likely to change as each side realizes the potential advantages of a
relationship. The West will gain access to large amounts of riskseeking capital. The SWFs will gain greater access to large Western
markets. As the world economy continues to become more
integrated, protectionist barriers will pose greater risks.
Protectionism will be tempting at times, but in the long run
protectionism will only isolate countries from the benefits of the
global economy. More progressive countries that welcome this new
form of capital will have a distinct advantage over more insulated
countries. As long as it's just business for SWFs, Western
governments have nothing to fear.

